Introduction
Defining and evaluating 'good government' requires some heroic assumptions. Which features of the operation of a government are valuable and to whom? If a government's goodness is to be defined by the nature and consequences of its policies, which policies and which results should be used as litmus tests? While most analysts would agree that the quality of a government depends on the extent to which it improves the welfare of its citizens (with due regard for the interests of and relations with others), the lack of readily available measures of welfare has led to a wide range of techniques being used for evaluation. Political scientists have tended to give pride of place to governmental systems that embody democratic principles and practices supported by the rule of law.
Economists have tended to evaluate systems of government, and institutions in general, in terms of their perceived ability to foster economic growth (sometimes with regard also for the distribution of the resulting goods and services).
In this paper we adopt a much broader perspective. We employ survey measures of life satisfaction as though they were direct measures of utility, and use them to evaluate alternative features and forms of government. Since measures of life satisfaction are now available for many countries, they offer a potential new tool for comparative political economy. If these data are to provide valuable new insights, they must be seen to tell at least a slightly different story from other evaluation methods, and to do so in a convincing way. This is an ambitious research agenda, in which the results we report here are neither the first nor the last words. In this paper we first show that several different measures of governmental quality are highly correlated with cross-national differences in life satisfaction. Although many of the same measures of governmental quality have been shown to affect prospects for economic growth, our evidence suggests that the income 1 Department of Economics, University of British Columbia. Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the Oxford conference in honour of John Flemming, September 9-10, 2005 , and the Göteborg conference on the Quality of Government, Novermber 17-19, 2005 . Comments from Daron Acemoglu, Danny Kaufmann, Avner Offer, Torsten Persson, Guido Tabellini, Jan Teorell and Eric Uslaner are gratefully acknowledged. Further comments and suggestions to john.helliwell@ubc.ca. channel is a relatively minor part of the story, since the partial effects of government quality on life satisfaction are largely unaffected by the inclusion of average per capita incomes. This demonstration will occupy the next section of the paper. Then there are two sections of more detailed results, the first testing the robustness and likely channels of the links between governmental quality and life satisfaction, and the second using our data and methods to cast a slightly different light on some recently studied issues in comparative political economy. For example, it has been found that proportional and majoritarian democratic systems appear to have different implications for the size of government spending. But is this higher spending a good thing, as would be suggested by the argument that it reflects the design and implementation of broadly-based welfare systems, or a bad thing, as surmised by those (e.g. Barro 1991 ) who have reported that high ratios of government spending are associated with lower economic growth? Our direct measures of life satisfaction provide a possible method for evaluating the net welfare effects of alternative political institutions. We conclude with a summary of our results and proposals for further research.
Before launching into a presentation of results using subjective assessments of life satisfaction as a measure of utility, it is perhaps necessary to answer, at least in a provisional way, some of the sceptical questions that might be raised about our proposed research agenda. Many social scientists have viewed subjective data with suspicion, regarding such evidence as much inferior to more explicitly behavioural data. Second, many users of life satisfaction or happiness data have encountered difficulties posed by excluded variables and reverse causation. For example, cross-sectional studies based on individual data have shown an apparently large effect linking marriage to higher life satisfaction. Thinking in excluded variable terms, sceptics have argued that since inherent genetic personality differences have been shown to be strong determinants of life satisfaction, these excluded traits are likely to affect both happiness and marriage status because those with optimistic and extroverted personalities are likely to be both happier and married. Seen as an issue in reverse causation, any random factor that made someone happier would also make them more attractive to others. Such correlation with unmeasured personality differences is likely to be more important at the individual than at the national aggregate level, since personality types are likely to average out in large samples. But it has also been argued that even at the national level there may be differences in personality or mood that would affect responses to life satisfaction questions in ways not connected with 'real' differences in the quality of life (Kahneman and Riis 2005) .
Perhaps the strongest defence against contamination by personality differences is to take such traits directly into account. Entering measured personality differences at the individual level (Helliwell and Huang 2005) and at the aggregate level (Helliwell 2005, using personality data collected by Eysenck and Eysenck (1975) and collaborators, and assembled into an internationally comparable data set by Steels and Ones (2002) ) does indeed show them to have substantial importance in explaining life satisfaction, especially at the individual level. But in neither case does explicit allowance for these differences change the main results that were previously apparent.
The strongest support for the 'reality' of the subjective assessments of life satisfaction is that they tell a remarkably consistent story to that provided by suicide data (Helliwell 2004 ). The ability of the same variables to explain both life satisfaction and suicide in a consistent manner is especially remarkable because suicides tend to be drawn from those at the extreme lower tail of the distribution of life satisfaction (Koivumaa-Honkanen et al 2001) , and there is no guarantee that the determinants should be so similar. The fact that these two such different types of data tell the same story provides strong support for subjective assessments of life satisfaction. To counter the objection against the use of subjective data (an objection that is in any event seldom supported by research findings), the suicide data are based on ultimate and irrevocable decisions. The suicide data are also free of suspicions of reverse causation. Thus the fact that the suicide and life satisfaction data are well explained by the same model suggests that the life satisfaction results cannot be dismissed out of hand, whether by rejection of subjective data, by suggestions that the questions might be interpreted so differently in different countries as to make comparisons useless, or by the possible existence of reverse causation. Thus we are convinced that the life satisfaction data have strong claims to be used as direct measures of utility. Since they have been widely collected in the past, and are very easy and cheap to collect in the context of almost any survey, we think that they provide a promising tool for comparative assessments of the quality of governance.
Government, Income and Well-Being
Our next task is to show that using measures of subjective well-being to analyze the nature and consequences of government makes a difference. For starters, we show that the linkages between the quality of government and subjective well-being are stronger and have different functional forms than those between average per capita real incomes and subjective well-being. Compare the two panels of Figure 1 showing scatter plots of life satisfaction against average per capita incomes and the quality of government, as measured by an equally-weighted average of the six component indices in Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2005) . We shall show later that a useful distinction can be made between, on the one hand, the sub-components dealing with the electoral process and, on the other hand, the remaining four relating to the efficiency and trustworthiness of government operations, but the patterns shown in Figure 1 are replicated when any combination of components is used. Per capita real incomes are measured at purchasing power parities and are shown as ratios of US per capita GDP in 1995. The governmental quality measure used is from the closest available year in the Governance Matters IV database (Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi 2005) , and is an equally weighted average of the six component indexes, each of which is scaled to have, across the global sample, a mean of zero and a standard deviation of 1.0. For the 161 observations in Figure 1 , the income variable has a mean of .44 (SD=.28), governmental quality a mean of .69 (SD=.93, range -1.27 to +1.95), and life satisfaction, measured as each wave's average national response (with n averaging 1,000 in each country wave) on a ten point scale, has a global mean of 6.72 (SD=1.1).
What do the data show? In this tattered panel of 161 observations, the largest we could construct from the four waves (1981-84, 1990-93, 1995-97 and 1999-2000) of the World Values survey (Inglehart et al 2003 and Inglehart et al 2005) , there are one or more observations on life satisfaction and governmental quality from 75 different countries (or sub-national regions). Figure 2 replicates the same relationships, but for a sub-sample comprising the 66 observations from the most recent wave of the WVS.
Figures 1 and 2 suggest, as confirmed by the regressions shown in Table 1 , that the relation between life satisfaction and the aggregate governmental quality measure is tighter and more linear than that between life satisfaction and per capita incomes. For per capita incomes, a quadratic term is significantly negative, with diminishing life satisfaction returns to higher average real incomes. As can been inferred from Figures 1 and 2, and as shown by the split-sample regressions in Table 1 , the quadratic nature of the relation between average incomes and life satisfaction shows up only among countries with average annual incomes more than half as large as 1995 per capita GDP in the United States.
As is well established by many studies, per capita incomes and measures of governmental quality are highly correlated (.83 for the panel of 161 observations, and .86 for the latest cross-section of 66 observations), so that it is not always easy to disentangle their separate relations with other variables. In earlier work using the first three waves of WVS data (Helliwell 2003) , income was completely dominated by governmental quality whenever both were introduced in the same equation. Adding the full fourth wave, which includes a larger number of poorer countries, permits income to have some positive partial effect on life satisfaction, but it has little statistical significance, and is always dominated by governmental quality. To develop more precise estimates of the relative importance of income and governmental quality, we shall need to make use of the full disaggregated data set, which we shall do in the next section. We shall also test the size and robustness of the government quality variables by means of more fully specified models, alternative measures of governmental quality, and the impact of outlying observations.
What Matters, How Much, to Whom, and When?
In our first studies of the linkages between quality of government and life satisfaction, based on the first three waves of WVS data, we found that putting equal weight on all of the six Kaufmann et al dimensions was optimal (Helliwell 2003) . The fourth wave has 66 countries covering a larger spectrum of the developing world. With this broader range of incomes and stages of development, there is increasing evidence that different aspects of the quality of government matter at different stages of development. More specifically, there is a split between one sub-aggregate including two dimensions focussed on the operation of the democratic process (voice and political stability) and another of four components relating more to the delivery of government services and providing the institutional framework within which individuals, enterprises and communities connect (governmental effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption).
We refer to a simple average of the first two dimensions as GOVDEM, and the average of the latter four as GOVDO.
As shown in Table 2 , if we use the full four-wave sample of 161 observations for 75 countries to test the relative importance of the democratic and delivery dimensions of governance, we find that the effectiveness dimensions (GOVDO) have a strong positive weight, with the political dimensions (GOVDEM) having a slight negative weight.
However, this overall result masks a large discrepancy between what matters at different levels of income and development.
If we divide the full sample of 161 observations into those with per capita incomes less than half (n=96) and more than half (n=65) as large as in the United States in 1995, the results are strikingly but plausibly different. For the poorer countries, all of the emphasis is on the effectiveness dimensions, with the political dimensions having a negative partial effect on well-being. For the richer countries, this relative emphasis is reversed. Table 2 show that this pattern is replicated in the context of a more fully specified model embodying the key variables found to be important in earlier modelling of international differences in life satisfaction (Helliwell 2003 (Helliwell , 2004 (Helliwell , 2005 2 .
Subsequent equations in
The same pattern appears also in Appendix Table 1 , which shows parallel equations fitted using the full sample of 163,000 individual observations, and the component samples drawn from the poorer (n=101,000) and richer (n=62,000) countries. Finally, Table 3 shows, for the slightly smaller group of countries for which suicide and national unemployment and divorce rate data are also available, comparable equations estimated for life satisfaction and suicide.
All of the samples and equations support the finding that honest and efficient government are of especial salience for poorer countries, while voice, accountability and political stability are of greater relative importance for the richer countries. This provides a preference-based rationale for the long-standing finding (e.g. Lipset 1959) that countries with higher levels of per capita incomes are far more likely to be become and remain democracies, with the bi-directional causality being strong from the level of income to choice of the democratic form and close to zero from the democratic form to subsequent economic growth (Helliwell 1994 where it is reasonable to expect that services voted for will in fact be efficiently provided, and where there is a good chance that a vote will not simply replace one corrupt administration by another.
the life satisfaction effects of governmental quality, for the reasons suggested by Rothstein and Stolle (2004) . They argue convincingly that high quality government institutions have a positive influence on the level of social trust. By including social trust as a separate independent variable, our estimates of the effects of good government are independent of those flowing through higher levels of social trust. This helps to ensure that our estimates of the well-being effects of good government do not err on the high side. There is another more fundamental reason why we cannot treat the income equivalents reported to compare the value of good government relative to changes in average per capita incomes. This is because the income effects reported in the appendix table are all in relative terms, so that equal proportionate increases in all incomes would change no relative incomes. As shown in Appendix Table 1 , adding the aggregate level of GDP per capita, once the quality of government is separately accounted for, does not attract a significant coefficient. Another way of putting the point is that there are strong negative well-being externalities from increases in income. Ever since the pioneering studies of Easterlin (1973) , it has been frequently found that the subjective well-being effects of income have been primarily based on relative rather than absolute income levels. More recently, studies using large samples of Canadian data show that while personal or family income has a highly significant positive effect, there is an equally significant negative effect, of almost equal size, from average family income in the respondent's census tract (Helliwell and Huang 2005, Table 1 ). In contrast to the negative contextual effects of income, most other sources of individual well-being, and especially trust, community and neighbourhood engagement, and dense networks of family and friends, have neutral or positive externalities (Helliwell and Putnam 2004) . As for the consequences of good government, the individual-level and contextual effects are largely combined, since most measures are available only at the national level. However, the individual-level variables in Appendix Table 1 do In Table 4 we test the robustness of our basic model by adding a number of alternative measures of the quality of government to see if they either change the base results or suggest better measures. We test in particular the age of a country's democracy, the Another common form of robustness test involves ensuring that the results are not due to the individual or joint effects of extreme observations. We have found that removing any or all of the largest outlying observations leaves the results unchanged, and in Appendix Table 2 we show the equation with specific dummy variables for each of the countries for which the life satisfaction errors exceed 1.0 (slightly more than one SD on the 10-point scale). It is also possible that the results might depend excessively on a specific group of countries. The most likely candidates for this are the nations of the former Soviet Union, since their levels of life satisfaction and governmental quality are both very low. We present an equation including dummy variables for each of the post-FSU countries in our sample. As expected, this lowers significantly the coefficient on governmental quality.
However, the reduction is fairly modest in size, about one-quarter of the full-sample size of the coefficient, and the variable remains the largest and most significant variable explaining international differences in life satisfaction even when those countries are removed.
Finally, there is the possibility, as emphasized by King et al (2003) that there may be cross-cultural differences in the shape of the distribution of numerical responses, independent of some more fundamental differences in actual life satisfaction. To guard against this possibility, we estimated our basic model on five different dependent variables, each being the average of a different quintile of the life satisfaction distribution in each country. A further test was provided by using the share of respondents above or below particular cut-off points in the numerical distribution of responses. All of the results supported the basic model, and in particular the importance of governmental quality 3 .
Using Life Satisfaction Data in Comparative Political Economy
If we have succeeded in making our case that the quality of government should be a large part of any attempt to explain international differences in life satisfaction, and that the life satisfaction data themselves are plausible proxies for utility, then it might be useful to use our data and models to provide a fresh light on some issues in comparative political economy. We shall mention a few, in order to illustrate what might be some promising lines for further investigation.
We start with an issue relating to the channels whereby good government affects life satisfaction, aside from those flowing through levels of income per capita. We have already shown that the income channel is the smaller part of the story, especially for the richer countries, so it is useful to consider other channels. One obvious candidate is health, since it has long been established that self-perceived health status is perhaps the strongest determinant of life satisfaction (Helliwell and Putnam 2004) , and the quality of health care (especially public health, including water quality) is dependent on the quality of government. However, some researchers have been sceptical of the link between selfassessed health and SWB, since both may be contaminated by issues relating to question framing, personality differences, and mood (Kahneman and Riis 2005) . To avoid such risks we shall here make use of two objective measures of health status, life expectancy (LE) and health adjusted life expectancy (HALE), where the latter variable is equal to the former reduced by a measure of morbidity, converted to life-equivalent years, based on the frequency, duration and severity of a number of illnesses, afflictions and disabilities (World Health Organization 2005) . In our equations in Table 5 , we first re-estimate our life satisfaction equation for the 136 observations for which the World Health Organization data are available. We include both component measures, GOVDO and GOVDEM, since GOVDEM becomes important when we divide the sample by income level. We add first the simple measure of life expectancy (LE) and then the healthadjusted life expectancy (HALE). Either measure of life expectancy adds significantly to the explanation of life satisfaction, with health-adjusted life expectancy being the more important of the two. This is followed by an equation that contains the two components of HALE separately, one being simple life expectancy and the other a measure of morbidity (morbid=le-hale). For the full sample of 136, the coefficient on morbidity is slightly, but insignificantly, higher than on life expectancy, so the adjusted fit of the equation is slightly inferior to that when HALE is treated as a single variable.
Next we consider the likelihood that the importance of the two components of health, and of the role of good government, differs by income level, as was true for the larger sample of countries. We thus re-estimate the equation without health separately by income class, and then add the two components of health. The samples are now getting rather small, at least in terms of number of countries represented 4 , and the correlations between the two health measures are rather high 5 , as are those between GOVDO and GOVDEM 6 . These equations show that the link between government quality and health that is so clear in the global sample is largely determined by differences between the rich and poor countries in both health and governmental quality, and by differences among the poor countries. More specifically, for the poor countries GOVDO is very important for life satisfaction with or without the health variables. Life expectancy has the major impact on life satisfaction, 4 There are 72 observations from 37 poorer countries and 64 observations from 27 richer countries in the 136-observation sample for which health data are available. Given that errors are clustered by country (this clustering is duly accounted for in the calculation of robust standard errors), the number of countries is more important than the number of observations. 5 -.56 for the 136 observations, but less than half as great for the sub-samples at -.16 for the richer countries and -.27 for the poorer countries. 6 These are +.96 for the 136 observations, +.81 for the rich country sub-sample and +.93 for the poor country sample.
and when it is added to the equation the coefficient on GOVDO drops by one-quarter, just as was the case in the global sample.
Among the rich countries, it is variations in GOVDEM that are related to differences in life satisfaction, and neither government coefficient is significantly altered by the addition of the health variables. As for the coefficients on the health variables, higher morbidity does lead to significantly lower life satisfaction, while differences in life expectancy do not. This pattern of differences is theoretically plausible: for the rich countries, the major gains in life expectancy are already achieved to roughly comparable degrees, while for the poorer countries there is a significantly lower average life expectancy, and much greater variation among countries 7 . This suggests that public health measures responsible for big increases in life expectancy have largely been put in place among the richer countries, while among the poorer countries there remains much more to be done and much greater variability in the capacity of governments to do what is required. This is revealed by levels of GOVDO that are on average much lower and more variable in the poor country sample than among the richer countries 8 .
In summary, good health appears to be a fundamental determinant of life satisfaction, with relative importance shifting from life expectancy to morbidity as per capita income increases. A significant fraction of the estimated effects of governmental effectiveness (as measured by GOVDO) on life satisfaction may be due to the ability of well-governed countries to design and deliver conditions conducive to longer and healthier lives. This result should be treated as suggestive rather than definitive, as it has not been tested systematically against possible competing hypotheses. If the results hold, they offer another reason for thinking that preferences over alternative government structures are endogenous to the stage of development, since voters will naturally pay most attention to 7 Life expectancy averages 78.4 years, with a standard deviation of 1.37, for the rich-country sample, while it is 72.2, with a standard deviation of 3.5, for the observations from poorer countries. 8 For the poor-country observations, the mean of GOVDO is 0.25, with a standard deviation of 0.80, compared to a mean of 1.65 and a standard deviation of 0.40 for the rich-country observations. the ability of different types of government to deal with the problems that most imperil their current and future levels of life satisfaction 9 .
Recent World Bank survey work in Peru (Kaufmann, Montorial-Garriga and Recanatini 2005) shows that the poor suffer more than the rich from corruption in government, in terms of both price and accessibility. If this result is also applicable in other countries, then we should expect to find that the well-being gains from higher quality government should be greater for the poor than for the rich, not just between countries but within countries. We tested this by splitting the govdo variable into two, with one applicable to individuals in the top half of the income distribution and another to those in the bottom half. We find that the effect of govdo is more than one-third greater for those in the bottom half of the income distribution 10 . In addition to this differential effect of governmental quality on the rich and the poor within each nation, Table A1 shows that the effects of governmental quality are also higher in poorer than in richer countries.
We turn now to consider some ideas about the consequences of alternative constitutional forms of government. Taking a recent important example, we shall see if our data can shed any further light on the theory and evidence suggesting that presidential and majoritarian constitutional forms generally have smaller governments than do parliamentary and proportional systems, and that majoritarian systems are likely to lead to lower levels of welfare state spending (Persson and Tabellini 2003, 2004; Persson 2003 Persson , 2004 Persson , 2005 . It is tempting to ask then if one or the other type of constitutional form is associated with higher life satisfaction, with or without accounting separately for the channels through which these welfare effects might be expected to flow.
The equations in Table 6 first repeat our basic equation for the 137 observations for which the Persson and Tabellini data for presidential and majoritarian systems are available. The results suggest that constitutions with some form of proportional voting (maj=0) and presidential systems are associated with higher life satisfaction, holding constant the levels of governmental effectiveness. Where the sample is split by income level, the apparent preference for the proportional voting system applies in both cases, while the preference for a presidential system applies only among the poorer countries.
These results all hold constant the level of governmental effectiveness. When we remove this variable, in the next set of equations, to estimate something more akin to a reducedform, the preference for proportional voting remains, while that for a presidential system does not. This reflects the fact that levels of corruption are higher and governmental effectives lower (both at r=.44 with maj) in presidential systems.
What is there about majoritarian systems that leads them to be associated with lower average levels of life satisfaction? Persson and Tabellini (2003) That is about all we have space to do by way of example use of the life satisfaction data.
There is however one set of issues on which we should at least provide a preliminary view of the data, with more thorough analysis to follow. In Table 7 
So What? And What Next?
In this paper we have advocated, and experimented with, the use of life satisfaction data to study long-standing questions in political economy. We first proposed that life satisfaction data provide a measure of utility broad enough to embrace most or all of the intermediate objectives that have previously been used by social scientists to evaluate the quality of government. We showed that life satisfaction data give different verdicts about the importance of different aspects of government. In particular, our results suggest that the Governance IV measures of the quality of government (Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi 2005) strongly dominate per capita incomes as determinants of life satisfaction. There is ample evidence that better government does improve the prospects for higher per capita incomes, and this is revealed in our equations by reductions, generally in the 10% to 25% range (and sometimes significant, depending on the sample and specification) in the government effect when per capita incomes are included.
Nonetheless, the effects of good government remain as the single most important variable explaining international differences in life satisfaction, while international differences in per capita incomes are frequently insignificant. The main life satisfaction effects of incomes, once basic needs are met, appear to flow from relative rather than absolute incomes, with the reference groups being national or sub-national in scope. This explains why relative incomes within national economies continue to show strongly significant effects. The basic needs element explains why the role of relative incomes is larger and more sustained within and among the poorer countries (although small relative to other factors, as shown in Appendix Table 1 ).
Once the general importance of government was established, we turned to consider possible differences among countries in which aspects of good government are most supportive of life satisfaction. We found, for the global sample as well as for sub-samples defined by splitting countries by per capita income level, that the six dimensions of governance quality measures fall easily into two groups, the first group of four dealing with the efficiency and trustworthiness of the design and delivery of government, and a second group of two dealing primarily with the electoral process (voice and accountability, and political stability). For the global sample, and especially for the subgroup of poorer countries, the first variable is of primary importance, while the second is of little or no importance. For the richer countries considered as a sub-sample, however, the situation is rather different, with the political dimensions coming to play a much greater role. For these countries, which already tend to have higher and fairly uniform levels of governmental efficiency, there is greater focus on the mechanisms whereby governments are elected and made accountable. In Table 8 we test further disaggregation of the six component measures, with interesting results. First, we find that two of the measures of the quality of service provision (effectiveness and freedom from corruption) have well-being effects that are large and significant, and of roughly the same size and significance for rich and poor countries alike. By contrast, the partial effects of the rule of law and quality of regulation are negative (although not significantly so) for the rich countries. For the poorer countries, the quality of regulation has a strong positive effect and the rule of law a strong negative effect. We also split the GOVDEM variable into its two components, to test the hypothesis that the variable's lack of positive influence in poor countries might be due to the possibility that political stability might be a mixed blessing, with stable autocracies reflecting the dark side of stability. The results show
That political stability and voice have coefficients that do not differ significantly from each other in either group of countries, but do differ between the countries. The only significant effect is the positive effect of voice in the sample of richer countries. Of course, as we have already seen, there are high simple correlations among the six measures of governmental quality, so that it is not surprising that they often do not show significantly differing effects, especially within sub-samples of restricted size.
Nonetheless, there appears to be a hierarchy of preferences for different aspects of government, with the ability of governments to provide a trustworthy environment, and to deliver services honestly and efficiently, being of paramount importance for countries with worse governance and lower incomes. The balance changes once acceptable levels of efficiency, trust and incomes are established, with more attention paid to building and maintaining voter engagement. These are our preliminary but suggestive findings on the evolution of preferences across dimensions of good government.
After a series to robustness tests, we turned to consider health as a determinant of life satisfaction, and as a channel whereby good government aids life satisfaction. Once again there appeared to be some change of relative importance as development proceeds, with life expectancy more important among those countries where it is low and variable, and good health more important among the richer countries, where life expectancy is generally high and fairly uniform.
We then illustrated in a preliminary way how life satisfaction data could be used to shed a different light on various issues in comparative political economy. If our case is accepted, at least in a provisional way, then life satisfaction data should be collected much more broadly and routinely. Since the relevant questions can be added at little or no cost to surveys being used for other purposes, there is ample scope for rapid increases in the relevant pool of data. Perhaps the biggest limitation on the use of life satisfaction data in comparative political economy is that there is very little in the way of panel or even repeated-sample data in many countries. Within countries, large samples of location-specific data are needed if life satisfaction data are to be used to assess the nature and consequences of sub-national differences in governance.
Even within the confines of the available data, there are many hypotheses that can be usefully assessed or re-assessed, using life satisfaction data. In our view, these data provide the broadest and least assumption-driven way to evaluate the quality of government.
Persson, Torsten, and Guido Tabellini Predicted maj from the first stage regression using the Persson and Tabellini set of instruments
The following data and the associated labels are mostly taken from Persson, Torsten, and Guido Tabellini (2003) For interpretation of govdo, incnat, trustnat and godn, see footnotes of Table 1 and Table 2 gini:
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